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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: DOE’S REVIVAL OF PLUTONIUM LASER PURIFICATION PLANT POSES SEVERE PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM RISKS WASHINGTON D.C. April 30, 2004 --/WORLD-WIRE/-- The Department of Energy’s plan to revive the long-dormant plutonium AVLIS (Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation) Plant at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory poses severe nuclear proliferation and terrorism risks, the Nuclear Control Institute warned today. NCI Founding President Paul Leventhal noted the recent discovery of a secret laser enrichment program in Iran and said, “Given the urgency of U.S. efforts to win wide international support for shutting down Iran’s nuclear weapons program, this is surely precisely the wrong time to start up a nuclear-weapons AVLIS program at Livermore National Laboratory.” Testifying at a hearing examining DOE’s pending Environmental Impact Statement for the laboratory, he said: “A major defect of the…EIS is that there is no non-proliferation analysis of the impact of the plutonium AVLIS program.” He recalled two previous rejections by Congress and the White House of attempts by DOE to use laser technology to mine weapons-grade plutonium from so-called reactor-grade plutonium produced by commercial nuclear power plants and fuel-grade plutonium produced by DOE’s reactors. In 1982, Congress reacted by enacting the Hart-Simpson-Mitchell Amendment prohibiting use of commercial plutonium or enriched uranium. In 1989, Congress responded to non-proliferation and terrorism concerns expressed by the U.S. National Research Council and a group of experts organized by the Nuclear Control Institute by sharply reducing funding for what was then called the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) plant. The following year the Reagan Administration cancelled the SIS. “Those arguments are equally applicable today,” said Leventhal in submitting the experts’ letter and the Council’s report to DOE. The experts, who included Gerard Smith, former chief SALT I negotiator and former ambassador-at-large for nuclear non-proliferation, warned that construction and operation of the SIS plant in would threaten U.S. non-proliferation objectives without providing offsetting national-security benefits. They cited “obvious nuclear proliferation and terrorism risks, as well as safeguards and verification problems.” Leventhal criticized DOE for being vague about what plutonium isotopes the plant would produce for the Stockpile Stewardship program, for not looking seriously at alternative means for producing them, and for not ruling out eventual use of the plant for purifying commercial plutonium into weapons grade or the export of laser refinement technology to other countries. CONTACT: Paul Leventhal 202-822-8444 leventhal@nci.org |
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